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Abstract 
The rapid transformation of urban socio-spatial landscape in China has resulted in an 
increasing degree of frustration and discontent among local residents who face threats of 
demolition and eviction. This has given rise to sporadic protests by local residents who are 
often known as ‘nail households’, that is, persistent protesters who are fixed to the land and 
hold onto their dwellings in protest against unwilling eviction and demolition of their 
dwellings. The presence of these protesters provides an effective example of local residents’ 
out cry in China. This paper is an attempt to critically re-visit the existing debates on local 
residents’ property rights activism in urban redevelopment processes, and to discuss the 
extent to which it can be an effective strategy. The paper refers to the right-to-the-city 
debate to examine whose right counts in China’s urban renewal contexts. It also makes use 
of empirical findings, both quantitative and qualitative, to examine how nail houses are 
received among local residents and migrants, and discusses the extent to which migrants can 
fit into local residents’ struggle against the top-down imposition of neighbourhood 
transformation. The paper ultimately calls for the need to form a place-based alliance that 
enables urbanites including migrants to come together to launch an effective claim on their 
right to the city. 
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Introduction 
China’s urban transformation has produced “city of Chai” (Campanella, 2008). Chai, 
meaning ‘demolition’, is inscribed on the surface of every built structure that is doomed for 
demoltion as part of urban development. Because of its heavy focus on physical 
transformation involving wholesale demolition of dwellings and residents’ displacement, 
China’s urban renewal incurs an escalating degree of residents’ frustration. The amendment 
to the Constitution in 2004 and the enactment of the Property Rights Law in 2007 laid a 
legal foundation for the protection of lawfully acquired private properties from unlawful 
expropriation. These legal changes have further fuelled discontents and angst among those 
displacees who fear that their perceived legitimate rights to their land and housing would be 
violated (Hsing, 2009). 
 
One of the expressions that has captured the nation’s attention in recent years is ‘nail 
households’, (in China, ding-zi-hu). This refers to those persistent resisters who are fixed to 
the land and hold onto their dwellings in protest against unwilling eviction and demolition 
of their dwellings, which substantially hinders the progress of urban projects driven by local 
authorities and developers (see for instance, Watts, 2007; Yardley, 2007). These struggles 
often lead to fatal incidents in which protesters take on drastic measures, even risking their 
own lives through self-immolation. One of the latest incidents involved the self-immolation 
of three family members in Fuzhou, Jiangxi province (China Daily, 2010). The strategy of 
resisting eviction is largely based on the property rights notion that is held by homeowners, 
and sometimes by public tenants who have lived in their administratively allocated rental 
dwellings until eviction. In this regard, these struggles are often viewed from the 
perspective of ‘property rights activism’ (Lee, 2008). Nail households are mostly 
succumbed to the power of local authorities and/or developers, and become displaced with 
or without expected compensation, but they provide an effective example of local residents’ 
outcry in China where struggles for political rights are beginning to emerge, albeit 
sporadically (Goldman, 2005). 
 
Against this background, this paper is an attempt to critically re-visit the existing debates on 
local residents’ property rights activism in urban redevelopment processes, and to discuss 
the extent to which it can be an effective strategy for urban residents. I do this by referring 
to the debates on the ‘right to the city’ (Lefebvre, 2003; Marcuse, 2009) to examine whose 
right counts in China’s urban renewal contexts in particular, and also by resorting to 
empirical findings to examine how nail houses are received among local residents and 
migrants. In doing so, this paper makes substantial contributions in several ways. First, it 
extends the right to the city debates to urban China contexts, and through this localisation, 
attempts to produce what Laurence Ma (2007) refers to as “local epistemologies”. This 
requires the construction of a critical and comprehensive local knowledge about the 
experience of local residents, which is embedded in the existing regulatory practices and 
institutional settings. Second, this paper is an attempt to respond to the urgent call to go 
“beyond empiricism” in urban China studies, and to address “the critically important issues 
of social and environmental justice” (Ma, 2007, p.556). While expressing “a strong sense of 
empathy for the feelings and experiences of the disadvantaged individuals under study” 
(ibid, p.563), that is displaced residents in urban renewal projects, it is also necessary to 
carry this out with the support of a more grounded knowledge about how nail houses are 
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understood and viewed by local residents. The latter aspect in particular has been relatively 
scarcely studied in the existing literature. Third, this study gives a particular emphasis to 
how migrants in cities can fit into the overall struggle against top-down imposition of 
demolition that affects their own rented homes. While there are numerous studies that 
empirically discuss the residents’ spatial and social experiences in their destination cities, 
the existing debates on urban residents’ struggle against demolition and urban renewal tend 
to focus implicitly on urban permanent residents
1
 who hold local household registration 
status and enjoy comparatively more privileged access to urban and social services based on 
what can be termed as ‘local citizenship’ (Smart and Smart, 2001). This paper is an attempt 
to address how migrants can fit into the overall discussions about local residents’ struggle in 
the process of urban transformation that has been carried out largely in favour of land-based 
political and business interests (Hsing, 2010). Fourth and finally, this paper makes use of a 
set of both quantitative and qualitative data collected as part of my recent research project in 
Guangzhou, which includes enquiries into the views of local residents and migrants on nail 
houses. The resulting analysis sheds light on the possible opportunities to form a place-
based alliance that enables urbanites with various characteristics (e.g. housing tenure, 
household registration status and neighbourhood location) form an effective collective claim 
on the right to the city. 
 
The rest of this paper consists of six sections. The paper initially reviews the literature on 
the right to the city and draws implications for residents facing urban renewal and 
displacement in China. Then, it explains in more detail how nail houses have emerged in 
China in the context of urban renewal, and then moves on to elaborate on the limits of 
existing property rights activism. These discussions will lay the foundation for my 
subsequent argument that the struggle to claim the right to the city is a political act that 
requires the construction of solidarity between disparate social groups and their collective 
action. Here, evidence is presented in two sections, demonstrating that this construction of 
solidarity really has potential on the basis of a supportive feeling for nail-house activities. 
The final section draws concluding thoughts. 
 
Contextualising the right to the city: Whose right counts 
There is growing interest among academics, activists and ordinary citizens about how to 
claim the ‘right to the city’. The concept has also been increasingly borrowed by 
international organisations such as the United Nations Habitat to refer to the acquisition of 
redistributive justice (e.g. provision of infrastructure or tenure regularisation in informal, 
slum settlements). The Lefebvrian notion of the right to the city, however, goes beyond the 
normative framework and actively seeks political programmes to intervene and take control 
of the process of the production of urban space (Lefebvre, 2003). As Lefebvre states: 
“...the right to the city is like a cry and a demand...The right to the city cannot 
be conceived of as a simple visiting right or as a return to traditional cities. It 
can only be formulated as a transformed and renewed right to urban life” 
(Lefebvre, 1996, p.158; original emphasis) 
                                              
1  For instance, Shih (2010) discusses Shanghai’s changing renewal practices by focusing on how the 
“residents’ legal rights of ‘return settlement’” have changed over time with no reference to migrants 
who would have a very different set of experiences in the same place. 
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For Lefebvre, the proliferation of capitalist accumulation has resulted in an increasing level 
of disenfranchisement of urban inhabitants. To reverse the process, Lefebvre calls for the 
right to the city that involves “an urban spatial approach to political struggles with the 
participation of all those who inhabit the city without discrimination” (Dikeç 2001, p.1790). 
According to Mark Purcell, two essential rights are at the heart of Lefebvre’s right to the 
city: the right to participation and appropriation (Purcell, 2002). The former right to 
participation calls for urban inhabitants to take a key role in decisions related to the 
production of urban space. On the other hand, the right to appropriation involves 
confrontation with the process of capital accumulation that is centred around the 
valorisation of urban space (ibid, pp.101-103). 
 
David Harvey pays more attention to the fundamental political economic contradictions in 
the capitalist accumulation processes. He argues that “Patterns in the circulation of surplus 
value are changing but they have not altered the fact that cities...are founded on the 
exploitation of the many by the few” (Harvey, 1976, p.314). Hence, Harvey focuses on the 
process of accumulation by dispossession, which does not simply occur at the primitive 
stage of capitalist development, but at various stages of capitalism to supplement existing 
cycles of accumulation, constituting the “core of urbanization under capitalism” (Harvey, 
2008, p.34). The struggle to acquire the right to the city in this regard inevitably centres on 
struggles against the capitalist accumulation in order to protect the rights of, e.g. villagers 
who lost their lands due to natural resource development. 
“The right to the city is far more than the individual liberty to access urban 
resources: it is a right to change ourselves by changing the city. It is, 
moreover, a common rather than an individual right since this transformation 
inevitably depends upon the exercise of a collective power to reshape the 
processes of urbanization” (Harvey, 2008, p.23) 
In this regard, the demand for the right to the city should be about gaining “greater 
democratic control over the production and utilization of the surplus” (Harvey, 2008, p.37). 
With his understanding that the contemporary urbanisation is part of neoliberal projects to 
provide a spatial fix to the crisis in the accumulation of capital, the notion of the right to the 
city is not just about merely expanding inhabitants’ access to the city in quantitative terms 
but about making cities qualitatively different (Harvey, 2003). Henri Lefebvre’s right to the 
city is also based on autogestion, which refers to the “democratic participation, workers’ 
self-management, and control of ordinary peoples’ destinies” and which “must be 
perpetually negotiated and enacted, relentlessly practiced and earned” (Merrifield, 2006, 
p.140). The key is to “bring people together to oppose the ‘omnipotence’ of the state and 
multinational capital” (ibid.). 
 
One of the challenges in this regard is the question of whose right counts, which is at the 
core of Peter Marcuse’s enquiry (Marcuse, 2009). Marcuse’s reinterpretation of Lefebvre 
understands the right to the city as involving “an exigent demand by those deprived of basic 
material and existing legal rights, and an aspiration for the future by those discontented with 
life as they see it around them, perceived as limiting their own potentials for growth and 
creativity” (p.190). Here, Marcuse makes a distinction using economic and cultural terms to 
define whose right we need to protect and expand. Economically, the deprived are classified 
as including the excluded (who are part of the capitalist system but without the social 
protections gained by the working class), and the working class itself. In cultural terms, 
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Marcuse emphasises the expansion of the right to be held by the directly oppressed (in race, 
ethnicity and so on) and the alienated (of any factions of economic class and social groups 
that resist the ruling system) (Marcuse, 2009). Other than these, those ruling groups who 
hold material interests (e.g. business people, gentry, capitalists, establishment intelligentsia 
and political elites) are thought to have already acquired the right to the city in their own 
terms. This point has also been echoed by David Harvey who also laments that 
“Increasingly, we see the right to the city falling into the hands of private or quasi-private 
interests” (Harvey, 2008, p.38). 
 
The right to the city debate has been around for some time, but it is yet to be translated into 
fully established urban practices. Some notable cases are reported, for instance, as in Brazil 
where the 2001 City Statute came to legally recognise the right to the city as a collective 
right (Fernandes, 2007). It is imperative to seek strategies that are tuned to various urban 
contexts, for the forms and shapes of the right to the city struggle should be imagined by 
taking into account the local configuration of institutional regulatory structures as well as 
the contradictions within specific political economic systems. As Dikeç (2001) states, 
“approaches to, and principles of, justice are time and space specific” (p.1788). Therefore, 
any discussions of identifying emancipatory right to the city and organising corresponding 
movements should address this specificity of time and space. The struggle to re-claim the 
right to the city for the oppressed, alienated and economically deprived would be subject to 
challenges of different nature, which are tuned to specific urban socio-political, economic 
and institutional contexts. With the need to involve marginalised urban populations and 
form a solidarity that goes beyond the conventional class-based labour movement, the right 
to the city movement becomes a struggle that attempts to secure access not only to urban 
space but also to “political space”, as Dikeç (2001) points out: 
“The right to the city, therefore, is not simply a participatory right but, more 
importantly, an enabling right, to the defined and refined through political 
struggle. It is not only a right to urban space, but to a political space as well, 
constituting the city as a space of politics. Urban citizenship, in this sense, 
does not refer to a legal status, but to a form of identification with the city, to 
a political identity” (Dikeç 2001, p.1790) 
What would all these mean for urban residents who experience displacement or forced 
eviction due to intense renewal activities in a country like China? First of all, China’s 
transition from a planned to a market-oriented economy has involved changes to the ways in 
which urban and social services are provided, which increasingly depend less on direct 
provision by the state and employers (known as work-units or danwei in China) (Wu and 
Huang, 2007; Smart and Smart, 2001). The protection of private lives including private 
properties is said to have a better prospect under the legal framework that goes through 
gradual reforms, while the state seems to establish itself more as a regulator and legal 
protector of various social rights (Thelle, 2004). In urban renewal scenes, this has led to the 
evolution of government regulations from in-kind compensation of displaced residences 
(e.g. on-site re-housing upon renewal project completion) to monetarised compensation 
(Shin, 2007; Shih, 2010). While in some cases the overall cash compensation for eligible 
resident might have been generous, the booming real estate market since the 1990s has 
meant that most displaced households find it beyond their financial means to relocate in 
neighbourhoods close to their original place of residence.  
 5 
 
Second, in China, the access to various urban and social services, including the right to 
receive redevelopment compensation, is conferred upon a particular notion of ‘citizenship’, 
redefined in the process of economic transition in such a way that renders citizenship rights 
as socio-economic benefits rather than “political claims against the State” (Keane, 2001). 
One of the persistent institutions that shape the geography of people’s access to various 
social rights is the household registration system (hukou in Chinese), which has been in 
place until the present since its formal implementation in 1958. It functions as a tenacious 
measure to dissociate migrants with no permanent local hukou from accessing various social 
services in their destination cities (Solinger, 1999). Li Zhang (2002) also finds that migrants 
are “still officially classified as temporary residents in the city and treated as noncitizens” 
(pp.317-318), facing “prejudice and unequal treatment in everyday life”, denial of basic 
services such as education for children, and denial of access to state-subsidised (rental) 
housing nor to construction of their own dwellings (ibid). It is apparent that China sees the 
imposition of ‘statist citizenship’ whose terms and conditions of exercising citizenship are 
determined by the state (Miraftab and Wills, 2005). Recently, evidence seems to suggest 
that there is a move towards blurring the boundary between agricultural and non-agricultural 
hukou, and to reshape the entitlement of citizens to strengthen instead the separation 
between permanent residents with local hukou and migrants (Smart and Lin, 2007; Smart 
and Smart, 2001). 
 
Third and continuing from the above point, the heavy influence of household registration 
system is also vividly pronounced in urban renewal processes. Compensation measures for 
displacees, both in-kind (e.g. relocation housing) or cash-based, have been largely based on 
one’s tenure status, the ownership of formally acknowledged property rights, and in 
particular, the possession of a local permanent hukou (in Chinese, changzhu hukou). All 
these act as a way of screening the eligibility of displacees for compensation (Shin, 2007). 
For residents in rural villages, their membership in village collectives also determine their 
eligibility for the receipt of benefits, if any, from village redevelopment (Hsing, 2010). 
Other than those tenants in private dwellings that are subject to the rent control by the 
government (that is, tenants with standard rents), most private tenants are effectively 
excluded from receiving compensation upon displacement, as they are required by 
government regulations to directly enter into negotiation with their landlords: the outcome 
is heavily skewed in favour of landlords. The most negatively affected are the migrant 
tenants without local permanent hukou, who are significantly disadvantaged in this process.
2
 
 
                                              
2  For instance, in Beijing, the detailed regulations for the city’s implementation of urban housing 
demolition and management in 1991 stated that owners and users of buildings subject to demolition 
were entitled to compensation (Article 4), but individual users were restricted to the holders of 
permanent hukou registered within the demolition boundary (Article 23) (BMG, 1991). In 2001 
when the regulations experienced a major change, property owners, public tenants or those tenants in 
private dwellings subject to standard rents were considered as the major recipients of compensation 
resulting from demolition (BMG, 2001). In Guangzhou, the 2003 regulation on the management of 
urban housing demolition also restricts any discussions of formal compensation to property owners 
and public tenants subject to government-regulated standard rents (Article 26) (GMG, 2003). The 
2009 guideline from Guangzhou on the renewal of inner-city areas provided preferential treatments 
to those property owners whose dwellings were smaller than 40 square metres only if they held 
Guangzhou urban hukou (Article 9 (GMBLRHM, 2009). The restriction of compensation eligibility 
to the holders of permanent hukou was also evident in Shanghai (Article 6) (SMG, 2006). 
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Therefore, any calls for the right to the city in Chinese cities in the context of urban renewal 
would require attention to those migrants and private tenants who are the least protected and 
alienated in urban processes. In this regard, the recent call for hukou reform by a number of 
Chinese newspaper editors in unison (Canaves, 2010) for instance is a political act, and it is 
only in this context can we understand why the central state has become so sensitive about 
the movement. 
 
Displacement, protests and ‘nail houses’ in China’s urban renewal 
Urban renewal in China has substantially intensified since the 1990s. Beijing, for instance, 
saw the introduction of a new policy in 1990, which relied heavily on the input (both 
technical and financial) from (not necessarily private) developers (see Shin, 2007). 
Clearance and redevelopment have become the norm of urban renewal policies since the 
1990s, accompanied by local residents’ large-scale displacement (Shin, 2009; Shih, 2010). 
While there is a growing emphasis on establishing the ‘rule of law’ in China, opportunities 
for ordinary citizens to put forward their claims are still narrow. Some commentators such 
as Cai (2007) believe that the mounting social pressure, exemplified by homeowners’ 
intensifying protests against housing demolition, would restrain government violations and 
expand the exercise of the ‘rule of law’. The latter tends to be adhered to when it does not 
violate essential interests of the government. Because of the limited opportunities in legal 
channels, protestors often make use of various “non-legal modes of resistance, including 
protests, petitions, and deadly confrontations” (ibid, p.194). With the help of the internet 
and the attention of some audacious media, these struggles sometimes produce a huge 
impact upon the society, at which point the government makes its concession by making 
extra provisions or allowing the court to handle. However, the results of the latter, even if 
successful, are not always transferrable to other similar cases (for instance, see Johnson, 
2004). 
 
Various measures appear to be taken by those who mobilise resources and support, 
including: (1) persistent appeals to higher courts; (2) media exposure; (3) winning the 
support of sympathetic (often high-ranking) leaders (O’Brien and Li, 2005, pp. 38-42). As I 
have discussed elsewhere (author, 2008), the reform of legal and administrative arbitration 
systems in recent years provide urban residents confronting unwilling displacement with a 
means to express their voices, albeit constrained and limited in its scope. While urban 
residents increasingly resort to law suits either individually or collectively (see Johnson, 
2004; Hsing, 2010), these law suit attempts are often marred by bureaucratic processes that 
act as barriers to plaintiffs, and the existing judicial processes tend to work in greater favour 
of the government and developers (Fang, 1999; Human Rights Watch, 2004; Johnson, 
2004). Taking a dispute case to the local court therefore is a very challenging experience, 
not to mention the low chance of winning against powerful elites and developers (O’Brien 
and Li, 2005). Studies show that in mainland China, very few people tend to have the will 
and intention to resort to formal measures when it comes to contesting the state (Li, 2004). 
 
The constraints upon local residents who are subject to displacement and who are short of 
means to change the course of neighbourhood demolition creates discontent. Nail 
households emerge out of these discontents, exercising their ‘right to stay put’ against 
external forces driven by land-based political and business interests (Hsing, 2010) (see 
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Figures 1 below). Referring to these protests, You-tien Hsing (2010) defines them as 
“individualized modes of protest, such as physically occupying homes and farms slated for 
demolition” (2010, p.18).3 As noted by Michael Ball, local residents’ blocking strategy to 
hinder the demolition and site clearance progress is likely to induce greater costs on local 
authorities and/or developers, as it buys time for residents to devise “an alternative preferred 
regeneration scenario” as well as creates space for “successfully making a political 
statement” (Ball, 2004, p.127). 
 
Figure 1: Defiant building standing alone in a cleared site of Tianjin © Hyun Bang 
Shin 2009 
 
 
Due to the very nature of nail houses that stand in the way of various development projects, 
they have been portrayed in negative images by government officials who may claim them 
to be of nuisance or the occupiers as trouble-makers. As Hsing argues (2010), protesters are 
“presented as uncooperative and opportunistic negotiators for higher compensation and are 
accused of sacrificing the public interests for personal gain, and even of causing housing 
price hikes” (p.78). Propaganda material in Figure 2 below clearly shows some examples of 
this government perspective, which report the latest propaganda initiatives that I came 
across in a case study neighbourhood in Guangzhou.
4
 Nail households are depicted here as 
those selfish neighbours who stand in the way of local community interests. However, the 
                                              
3  In Hsing’s discussions, nail houses appear largely in relation to peasants’ relocation. However, it 
would be reasonable to acknowledge that she was also regarding those protests by inner-city 
residents or residents in villages-in-the-city as part of nail house activities. This is evident in her 
following statement: “nail households who succeed in getting higher compensation are mostly inner-
city residents or residents of the urban fringe, rather than those in rural or semirural areas” (Hsing, 
2010, p.203). 
4  This neighbourhood is called Pazhou village in Haizhu District, and is further explained in a section 
that comes before the conclusion of this paper. 
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extent to which local residents of various household circumstances (e.g. housing tenure, 
household registration, migration) support nail house activities is not much revealed. Do 
they also regard these activities as something of nuisance? Is it only homeowners who have 
properties to protect, for instance, who feel sympathetic towards nail households? Before 
looking more into these questions, I will consider, in the following section, the emergence 
of property rights activism in recent years, and argue that the property rights reform during 
the last ten years or so has given rise to an increasing degree of property rights awareness, 
but that the property rights activism on the basis of this notion of property ownership in its 
current form in urban China is rather narrowly focused. 
 
Figure 2: Stigmatisation of nail house in Pazhou village 
 
 
Property rights, ownership and the limits of property rights activism 
The implementation of the Property Rights Law in 2007 and the amendment to the 
Constitution in 2004 have raised people’s expectation of having their privately owned 
properties protected. In particular, in the case of those in the owner-occupation sector that 
has become the dominant tenure form in contemporary Chinese cities since the late 1990s, 
this anticipation is more prominent. The growing notion of property rights and therefore 
amounting interests in protecting their properties as well as the quality of their 
neighbourhoods lead to what Ching Kwan Lee has referred to as ‘property rights activism’ 
(Lee, 2008). Similarly, You-tien Hsing also refers to nail houses as “the ultimate form of 
localized social activism” that attempts to protect local residents’ property and against its 
forceful expropriation (Hsing, 2010, p.207). 
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However, the question of how progressive these property owners can be needs to be further 
scrutinised. Experiences from the West have shown that the relationship between 
homeownership and civic virtue is multi-faceted. For left-leaning critics, the growth of 
owner-occupation leads to the proliferation of privatism that centers on one’s own lifestyle 
and secluded private space with owner-occupiers’ much less concern for political and social 
issues (Lundqvist, 1998). On the other hand, more conservative perspective would regard 
owner-occupiers as having greater willingness to participate in societal issues that affect 
their vested interests in privately owned properties (ibid). This would however be in so far 
as these societal issues affect their property values. For David Harvey, this would be the 
expression of “intense possessive individualism” (Harvey, 2008, p.32). What he means by 
this is that, with vested material interests in the exchange value of owned properties, 
homeowners’ political interests are known to be centred around preserving (and increasing) 
property values, which leads to fragmented forms of collective action with broken links with 
wider societal movement. 
 
Given the situation that there are more than 80 percent homeowners in urban China, it is 
important to point out that the time-constrained ownership of land use rights, which come as 
a bundle with full ownership of housing posits serious threats to both homeowners and to 
the state. As far as the land use right is concerned, the maximum duration of its possession 
by homeowners is typically 70 years for residential use, and there is much speculation over 
what would happen when it expires in the coming decades. This affects every home-owner 
in urban China, and therefore, provides a potentially solid platform on which society-wide 
solidarity among homeowners could be mobilised instead of neighbourhood- or estate-based 
fragmented movement to safeguard individual property values. 
 
Nevertheless, even if this kind of solidarity is to be mobilised, it may only involve mainly 
homeowners without necessarily being extended to those non-owners, who are either 
directly oppressed or alienated, to borrow Peter Marcuse’s terms, in China’s urban renewal 
contexts. This concerns the issue of how to define urban residents. For some time since the 
housing and property rights reform, the focus has been on the ownership of private 
properties and its protection. This was at the centre of the formulation of the Property 
Rights Law in the first place. How to define and categorise urban residents is also closely 
related to the issue of whose right to the city, discussed earlier in this paper. As I outlined 
earlier in this paper, the regulations on residents’ receipt of and negotiation over 
redevelopment compensation would divide urban residents into two distinctively separated 
groups: those permanent residents who are eligible for compensation (property owners and 
public sector tenants) and those who do not qualify (private tenants and migrants without 
local household registration) (Shin, 2007). Local residents’ protests and resistance to 
displacement and demolition (hence the rise of nail households) are to a large extent 
configured and dictated by the governing compensation-related regulations and the 
reconstruction of property rights institutions. In particular, China’s existing property rights 
and hukou institutions are experiencing changes that come to make certain segments of 
urban residents face severely constrained opportunities, if not completely barred, to take 
part and voice out against the ruling state (Shin, 2010). Private rental tenants and migrants 
who are marginalised in Chinese cities in spite of their immeasurable contributions to urban 
economic growth are the most negatively affected, eliminated from intervening in any part 
of urban planning processes (see Wu and Webster, 2010 for more discussions on 
marginalisation in urban China contexts). These marginalised groups constitute a substantial 
 10 
 
share of urban population. Yet, there is hardly any opportunity for them to voice out in city 
affairs, that would severely affect their life chances. 
 
I refer to two of the recent academic works to illustrate that much of the on-going debates 
on urban residents’ rights rest on those with entitlement to a set of rights based on their legal 
property ownership and hukou status. Cai (2007) for instance discusses protests by 
homeowners to protect their legal rights, and states that “The laws that are supposed to 
protect citizens are ineffective, and those stipulations made and enforced by governments at 
the central and local levels ignore their [homeowners’] interests” (Cai, 2007, p.194). 
However, the discussions here are by and large oriented towards homeowners. This may be 
grounded in the notion that homeowners are the legitimate holders of property rights, based 
on titles and deeds, without considering the rights to the use of house and land that much of 
migrants would hold on to. This goes very much against the very notion of the right to the 
city that Lefebvre has argued for. As Dikeç (2001) notes, “Lefebvre’s notion of the right to 
the city is a call to advance an urban spatial approach to political struggles with the 
participation of all those who inhabit the city without discrimination” (p.1790). 
 
The lack of attention to migrants’ rights in China’s urban development contexts is also 
evident in Hsing’s insightful publication on land-centred accumulation and land politics 
(Hsing, 2010). Hsing refers to “two types of housing protests in large cities” which include 
“property rights protests and residents’ rights protests” (Hsing, 2010, p.61). Here, the 
former refers to the protests by “private homeowners in the prerevolutionary era, whose 
property was appropriated by the Beijing Municipal Government” (ibid, p.61), while the 
latter refers to those launched by “property owners and tenants” who “shared a territorial 
identity as urban residents” (ibid, p.62). She goes on to say that “Residency was the 
physical anchor for the quotidian support networks of job, family, community, and urban 
service- the life-worlds -of city residents” (p.62), but does not link these to hukou issues. 
This is a key shortcoming, as the hukou status has been influencing heavily the eligibility of 
local residents to receive compensation upon displacement. In close relation to this, while 
Hsing rightly calls for equal attention to both homeowners and tenants for residents’ rights 
mobilisation based on their “place-based identity” (Hsing, 2010, p.83), she does not specify 
particular tenure types for tenants. That is, whether they are public rental tenants or private 
tenants, in particular migrant tenants in private dwellings. Various news reports covering 
protests against house demolition in China usually omit the precise nature of housing 
tenure, but this is largely due to the fact that the right of private tenants and especially 
migrants to redevelopment compensation and relocation measures is hardly guaranteed by 
existing legal and administrative institutions. Making a distinction between public and 
private tenants is therefore significant. The possession of local hukou, which also 
determines one’s access to local public rental housing in the first place, makes a great 
difference in terms of people’s mobilisation of what Hsing calls “residents’ rights”.5 The 
                                              
5  Hsing refers to public rental tenants when she addresses tenants’ protests. This becomes evident 
when we read the statement that says “One of the most common grievances of chaiqianhu protesters 
concerns ‘unfair relocation and demolition compensation’” (Hsing, 2010, p.73). She further states 
that “The majority of chaiqianhu wanted on-site relocation or relocation within the general area of 
their original homes” (ibid, p.74). ‘Relocation and compensation’ are for local hukou holders, that is, 
Beijing hukou holders in this circumstance. The absence of migrant tenants in Hsing’s work is also 
clearly witnessed when she discusses strategies of mobilisation. The first strategy of “sustaining 
rights claims” refers to protesters’ refusal to change addresses on residents’ identification cards after 
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question I raise here is: Is there a room for private (migrant) tenants to launch a concerted 
effort to fight against the authority to claim their collective right to the city? 
 
In my earlier paper on land, housing and property rights in poor neighbourhoods (author, 
2010), I have argued that the way forward in terms of resisting neighbourhood demolition is 
“to resort to the fragmentation of property rights, supported by the coalition of residents on 
the basis of rights-based awareness” (author, 2010, p.128). This proposition would require 
residents with access to the ‘use value’ of their neighbourhood and dwellings therein (rather 
than the ‘exchange value’ on the basis of access to formal property ownership) to come 
together, acknowledging the differences among them on the basis of their varying degree of 
accessing property ownership. Property rights activism by homeowners alone (and to some 
extent, by public tenants in urban China context) would be limited due to the fact that on the 
one hand, it provides a selfish pursuit of the notion of ‘just us’ (see Merrifield 1996 and 
Dikec 2001: p.1789 discussion on this notion). On the other hand, it fails to recognise the 
common language for all those who share particular time and space. For some, the pursuit 
of property rights activism may be understandably considered positive, but this should be to 
the extent of which the activism can bear some fruit in the authoritarian state like China. 
This strategy, however, requires a clear direction towards forming a coalition with those of 
different ownership entitlements, in particular with migrant tenants who make up a 
substantial proportion of urban population and private tenants. Whether or not this sense of 
solidarity can be constructed is an important issue, and there is more evidence to be 
collected. This is where I now turn to discussing empirical findings in the following two 
sections. 
 
Locating the feeling of sympathy for nail houses among urban residents 
Calling for the establishment of a coalition between homeowners and private (migrant) 
tenants to overcome the limits of property rights activism may sound utopian to some critics 
and onlookers. After all, nail households in Chinese cities have been known to be using 
‘stay-put’ tactics launched by mostly property owners, who have access to legally 
acknowledged formal property rights and therefore entitlement to compensation. These 
characteristics substantially differ from those of private tenants and especially migrants. The 
construction of a coalition between the disparate social groups involving private (migrant) 
tenants would require a sense of solidarity as the cornerstone of this political struggle. The 
immediate question is whether nail-house protests would receive support from private 
tenants and migrants who hardly reap the benefits, in both material and psychological terms, 
from the wholesale clearance of their neighbourhoods and displacement. 
 
In this section, a unique set of data from this author’s latest research project in Guangzhou, 
China, is analysed in order to investigate the degree of sympathy for nail houses among 
local residents. The results from both questionnaire survey and qualitative in-depth 
interviews with local residents will be examined. The survey was carried out in late 2009 in 
three neighbourhoods: one village-in-the-city called Pazhou village in Haizhu District and 
two inner-city neighbourhoods located in Liwan and Yuexiu Districts (see Figure 3 for the 
                                                                                                                                                      
displacement (ibid, pp.79-80), but again, this is not the kind of right that migrant tenants in particular 
can enjoy. 
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location of these neighbourhoods in Guangzhou). The selection of these neighbourhoods 
and their discussion in this paper are explicated by the nature of these neighbourhoods. 
Pazhou village is one of the numerous villages-in-the-city (cheongzhongcun in Chinese), 
which are frequently found in Guangzhou and the wider Pearl River Delta region. 
According to the basic information from the district planning bureau, Pazhou has more than 
3,000 villagers, and a large number of migrants whose number at peak time would reach 
nearly 10,000 people. Villages-in-the-city have been widely known for the concentration of 
high density buildings that are erected by local villagers to accommodate commercial 
activities and housing demand from migrant tenants. These villages-in-the-city are in fact 
former rural villages that have become urbanised in the midst of Guangzhou’s outward 
expansion (Chung, 2010; Tang and Chung, 2002). They are known for the high share of 
migrant population, proliferation of construction activities that do not conform to municipal 
planning regulations, and the domination of village collectives in local governance structure 
that often comes into conflict with the higher levels in the administrative hierarchy. On the 
other hand, inner-city neighbourhoods are known for more regular forms of built structure 
with historic origins and relatively high share of homeowners and public rental tenants, the 
latter usually allocated administratively. One of the study sites in my project is known as 
Zhibao neighbourhood, having 1858 households according to the basic information from the 
district planning bureau. Zhibao is the largest neighbourhood in a redevelopment district 
named Enninglu. The other neighbourhood is designated as a relatively small-scale 
redevelopment district known as Yuexiu South, and has over 600 households. The share of 
public housing in these two neighbourhoods reach about 40 and 50 percent respectively, 
thus suggesting a reasonably high share of dwellings that are in private hands. 
 
At the time of the survey, these neighbourhoods were under threat of demolition, influenced 
heavily by the municipal drive in preparation for the city’s hosting of the 2010 Summer 
Asian Games. In total, 675 responses were collected from the questionnaire survey: 255 
from Pazhou village, 260 from Zhibao and 160 from Yuexiu South.
6
 The questionnaire 
survey made efforts to ensure that the neighbourhood sample size was proportionate to the 
size of official estimates of neighbourhood population (obtained from local planning 
bureaux). As a detailed household registration data were not available, households in each 
neighbourhood were randomly selected by resorting to a random route method using street 
maps and house numbers, and by using a fixed interval approach to contact households on 
each street. Part of the questions in the survey included respondents’ awareness of the term, 
nail households, and if yes, their degree of having sympathy for nail households. 438 valid 
respondents turned out to be aware of this term, and the data collected from these 
respondents were subject to ordered logit regression analysis. Here, valid responses refer to 
those samples without missing values for the following four main variables: (a) housing 
tenure; (b) hukou status; (c) neighbourhood; and (d) concern for demolition in the near 
future. Ultimately, 381 cases were included in the regression.  
                                              
6   The survey aimed at obtaining the views of residents with local hukou and migrants on 
neighbourhood changes and housing transition, and therefore, households were selected in such a 
way as to make sure approximately an equal share of both groups could be included in the sample. 
Eventually, about 42 percent of the total survey respondents were migrants and the other 58 percent 
local residents with Guangzhou hukou. Given the demolition schedule of survey neighbourhoods, 
there remains the possibility that response is likely to be biased in favour of those who support nail 
houses, but the efforts by governments to discourage nail houses and depict them negatively also 
suggest that the survey may underestimate the full extent of respondents’ support for nail houses. 
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Figure 3: Location of study neighbourhoods in Guangzhou, China 
 
The key questions this section is going to consider are as follows. To what extent do people 
feel sympathy for nail houses? Is this sympathy dependent upon their housing tenure, hukou 
status or residential location? As indicated in Table 1, it turns out that the majority or 53 
percent of 438 respondents who were aware of the term ‘nail households’ indicated that they 
felt sympathetic towards nail houses. The trend is more or less similar even if the 
respondents are broken down into sub-categories such as housing tenure, the possession of 
Guangzhou hukou (either rural or agricultural), neighbourhood location, and people’s level 
of concern for demolition in near future. For instance, it is interesting to note that the 
majority of homeowners and public rental tenants (56 and 53 percent respectively) were 
feeling sympathetic towards nail houses. This is somewhat expected, given their assumed 
property rights awareness in the process of housing and property rights reform and their 
legally protected entitlement to redevelopment compensation upon their house demolition. 
What is more interesting, however, is the large number of private tenants, mostly migrants, 
who were also feeling sympathetic for nail houses (49 percent) even though they hardly 
receive compensation upon neighbourhood renewal and demolition of their rental dwellings. 
Furthermore, while 54 percent of Guangzhou hukou holders were feeling sympathy for nail 
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houses, one in two non-Guangzhou hukou holders also indicated a similar sentiment. 
However, while 55 percent of urban Guangzhou hukou holders indicated their sympathy for 
nail houses, slightly lower share (49 percent) of agricultural non-Guangzhou hukou holders 
were feeling sympathy for nail houses. 
 
Table 1. Degree of sympathy for nail households by various household characteristics 
Variable Variable value  Very much 
disagree 
Somewhat 
disagree 
don't know Somewhat 
agree 
Very much 
agree 
Total 
 
Tenure, 
Housing 
        
Homeowner n 13 61 38 73 69 254 
% 5.12 24.02 14.96 28.74 27.17 100 
Public tenants  n 3 10 9 10 15 47 
% 6.38 21.28 19.15 21.28 31.91 100 
Private tenants  n 7 38 25 42 25 137 
% 5.11 27.74 18.25 30.66 18.25 100 
         
Hukou status: 
GH for 
Guangzhou 
Hukou 
Guangzhou Hukou n 16 72 50 81 83 302 
% 5.30 23.84 16.56 26.82 27.48 100 
GH, urban n 16 65 44 74 80 279 
% 5.73 23.30 15.77 26.52 28.67 100 
GH, agricultural  n 0 7 6 7 3 23 
% 0 30.43 26.09 30.43 13.04 100 
non-Guangzhou hukou n 7 37 22 44 26 136 
% 5.15 27.21 16.18 32.35 19.12 100 
non-GH, urban n 0 6 4 11 5 26 
% 0 23.08 15.38 42.31 19.23 100 
non-GH, agricultural  n 7 31 18 33 21 110 
% 6.36 28.18 16.36 30.00 19.09 100 
         
Neighbour-
hood 
Pazhou village, Haizhu  n 9 39 31 49 34 162 
% 5.56 24.07 19.14 30.25 20.99 100 
Inner-city 
neighbourhoods 
n 14 70 41 76 75 276 
% 5.07 25.36 14.86 27.54 27.17 100 
Zhibao n 10 53 30 41 43 177 
% 5.65 29.94 16.95 23.16 24.29 100 
Yuexiu South n 4 17 11 35 32 99 
% 4.04 17.17 11.11 35.35 32.32 100 
         
Concern for 
demolition  
Not worried at all  n 13 67 37 71 49 237 
% 5.49 28.27 15.61 29.96 20.68 100 
Somewhat worried n 1 28 13 24 21 87 
% 1.15 32.18 14.94 27.59 24.14 100 
Very much worried n 9 14 22 30 39 114 
% 7.89 12.28 19.30 26.32 34.21 100 
         
Total  n 23 109 72 125 109 438 
  % 5.25 24.89 16.44 28.54 24.89 100 
         
 
The next question to probe is whether there is any significant difference in the degree of 
sympathy for nail-house activities among people of different characteristics especially in 
relation to their housing tenure. In order to find this out, the paper adopts regression 
analysis. The model specification, which follows below, specifies that a degree of sympathy 
for nail households is a function of housing tenure and other control variables such as 
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demographic characteristics, household characteristics and neighbourhood factors and so 
on. 
 
Nail House Sympathy = β0 + β1 * Housing tenure + β2 * Other controls + ε 
 
Here, the dependent variable is about ‘Do you agree or disagree that nail-house is an 
inevitable phenomenon?’ with options of (1) very much disagree, (2) somewhat disagree, 
(3) don’t know (4) somewhat agree, (5) very much agree. Due to the ‘ordered’ nature of the 
dependent variable, the model is estimated by ordered logit model. Table 2 presents the 
summary statistics for regression samples. 
 
Table 2. Summary statistics for regression samples 
Variables  Observation Mean
(a)
 
Age
(b)
 381 44.533  
Gender   
Male 381 0.441  
Female 381 0.559 
Tenure, Housing 
  
Homeowners 381 0.575  
Public tenants 381 0.113  
Private tenants 381 0.312 
Hukou 
  
GH, urban 381 0.633  
GH, agricultural 381 0.058  
non-GH, urban 381 0.063  
non-GH, agricultural 381 0.247  
Neighbourhood 
  
Pazhou village, Haizhu-qu 381 0.352  
Inner-city neighbourhoods 381 0.648  
       (Zhibao)  (0.420) 
       (Yuexiu South)  (0.228) 
Worry about demolition 
  
Not worried 381 0.533  
Somewhat worried 381 0.210  
very much worried  381 0.257  
Household assets (RMB) 
  
Less than 10,000 381 0.210  
10,000 ~ 50,000 381 0.205  
50,000 ~ 100,000 381 0.118  
100,000 ~ 200,000 381 0.160  
200,000 ~ 500,000 381 0.168  
Over 500,000  381 0.139  
Note: (a) Other than age, mean values for other variables refer to the share 
of respondents in each label; (b) A standard deviation, minimum and 
maximum values for ‘age’ are 12.916, 17 and 88 respectively. 
 16 
 
Table 3. Housing tenure and degree of sympathy for nail households 
(Dependent variable: ‘Do you agree or disagree that nail-house is an inevitable phenomenon?’ with 
options of (1) very much disagree, (2) somewhat disagree, (3) don’t know (4) somewhat agree, (5) 
very much agree) 
 (1)Tenure (2) Other controls (3) Demolition worry 
 Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. 
       
Tenure (private tenants exc.)      
Homeowners 0.476** (0.200) 0.651* (0.332) 0.575 (0.366) 
Public tenants 0.309 (0.322) 0.382 (0.462) 0.332 (0.459) 
Hukou (non-GH agricultural exc.)       
GH, urban   0.427 (0.420) 0.473 (0.425) 
GH, agricultural   -0.197 (0.459) -0.159 (0.440) 
non-GH, urban   0.472 (0.404) 0.521 (0.446) 
Neighbourhood (inner-city exc.)       
Pazhou village   -0.032 (0.250) 0.045 (0.272) 
Age   0.007 (0.011) 0.009 (0.011) 
Male   -0.054 (0.230) 0.031 (0.246) 
Head of household   0.319 (0.219) 0.325 (0.230) 
Size of household   0.082 (0.064) 0.085 (0.067) 
Education level (no schooling exc.)      
Primary to high school   -0.508 (0.735) -0.416 (0.743) 
College   -0.810 (0.814) -0.654 (0.826) 
University   0.034 (0.851) 0.185 (0.890) 
Employment status (in schooling exc.)      
No job after interrupting study   -2.601 (2.116) -2.859 (2.143) 
Non-paid family business   -3.239* (1.987) -2.998 (1.845) 
Unemployed   -3.064* (1.855) -3.007* (1.688) 
Retired   -3.087* (1.858) -3.067* (1.685) 
Never had a job   -2.882 (1.886) -2.890 (1.844) 
Employed, regular   -2.507 (1.825) -2.467 (1.652) 
Temp. worker   -2.929* (1.846) -2.948* (1.678) 
Self-employed   -2.726 (1.838) -2.631 (1.675) 
Farming   -2.851* (1.858) -2.900* (1.701) 
Regarding oneself as middle class  -0.393 (0.246) -0.383 (0.263) 
Size of living space   -0.000 (0.001) -0.000 (0.001) 
Log of monthly household income  -0.070 (0.160) -0.085 (0.183) 
% share of rental income   0.732 (1.255) 0.595 (1.270) 
Respondent being party member  1.195* (0.668) 1.233* (0.683) 
Presence of party member in household  0.688*** (0.254) 0.773*** (0.255) 
Length of stay in neighbourhood   -0.010 (0.008) -0.012 (0.009) 
Household assets including real estate 
(over 500,000 RMB exc.) 
      
Less than 10,000   -0.304 (0.468) -0.393 (0.464) 
10,000 ~ 50,000   0.314 (0.444) 0.231 (0.438) 
50,000 ~ 100,000   0.515 (0.470) 0.454 (0.469) 
10,000 ~ 200,000   0.761* (0.406) 0.815** (0.398) 
200,000 ~500,000   0.189 (0.373) 0.102 (0.375) 
Concern for demolition (very much worried 
exc.) 
      
Not worried     -0.677*** (0.255) 
Somewhat worried     -0.492 (0.322) 
Pseudo R-squared 0.0048  0.0442  0.0510  
No. of obs. 381  381  381  
Note: *, **, *** significant at 10%, 5%, 1% respectively. Robust standard errors are in parentheses 
 
Table 3 is the first set of results from this regression model. The coefficient of homeowners, 
for instance as in Model (1) in Table 3, represents the difference between homeowners and 
private tenants in the extent to which they feel sympathetic about the inevitability of nail-
house activities. A positive coefficient implies that homeowners are more likely to feel 
sympathetic about nail households in comparison with private tenants. As shown in Model 
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(1) in Table 3, it appears that when only the housing tenure variable is controlled for, 
homeowners are more likely to feel sympathetic than private tenants, and this likelihood is 
statistically significant (at five percent level). There is no statistical difference in the degree 
of sympathy for nail houses between public and private tenants. 
 
In Model (2) of Table 3, more explanatory variables are controlled for, as they are thought 
to affect the relationship between the degree of sympathy for nail households and housing 
tenure status. Yet, as shown in the table, the coefficient of homeowners becomes larger, 
though the significant level decreases from five percent to ten percent. This implies that 
homeownership turns out to have a reasonably independent effect on sympathy for nail 
households from other explanatory variables such as age, gender, education level, household 
assets
7
 and so on.  
 
Table 4 shows more understandable results of Model (2) in Table 3. It shows a probability 
of choosing each degree of sympathy by hypothetical homeowners and tenants who are 
highly comparable in every aspect but their housing tenure.
8
 For highly comparable 
homeowners and private tenants, in every aspect other than their housing tenure, the 
homeowner group have probabilities of 28.1 percent and 32.7 percent respectively of 
‘agreeing with nail households very much’ and ‘agreeing somewhat’ while for private 
tenants the figures are 16.9 percent and 27.7 percent respectively. 
 
Table 4. Probability of choosing degrees of sympathy by ‘comparable’ homeowners 
and renters 
Tenure, Housing very much 
disagreed 
somewhat 
disagreed 
don't know somewhat 
agreed 
very much 
agreed 
Homeowners 3.65% 20.75% 14.87% 32.65% 28.09% 
Public tenants 4.73% 24.97% 16.14% 31.18% 22.99% 
Private tenants 6.78% 31.46% 17.12% 27.73% 16.92% 
 
To what extent is homeowners’ sympathy for nail houses influenced by their concern for 
demolition? It may be hypothesised that those people who are more concerned for 
demolition of their homes would feel more sympathetic for nail-house activities. Model (3) 
in Table 3 suggests that when a degree of concern for demolition is controlled for, the size 
of coefficient for homeowners goes down from 0.651 to 0.575, and it is no longer 
statistically significant. The implication is that compared to private tenants, homeowners 
are more sympathetic for nail households not because of housing tenure status itself but 
because of the difference in the degree of demolition concern between homeowners and 
private tenants. It turns out that those who worry about demolition tend to have a greater 
                                              
7  It should be acknowledged that the questionnaire survey with regard to the size of household assets 
might not have captured the actual size. The reasons may be diverse, including under-reporting of 
their actual financial and real estate assets or unclear notions of the market value of their real estate 
properties. Therefore, the responses to the household asset question could only be taken as indicative 
of the respondents’ notion of their asset size. It can be confirmed that homeowners who own 
properties tend to cluster around the higher end of the asset size, while tenants tend to cluster around 
the lower end. 
8  The figures bear a property of 'holding all other characteristics constant' across different housing 
tenure groups and hence the differences in the numbers across different tenure types are entirely 
attributed to nothing but housing tenure. 
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sympathy for nail households, and this is felt greater among homeowners on average: This 
indicates that homeowners with tangible properties under threat by demolition tend to 
display a greater degree of sympathy for nail households. 
 
Lastly, Table 5 presents a neighbourhood effect on the relationship between housing tenure 
and people’s feeling for nail houses. That is, the table shows whether the degree of 
relationship varies by neighbourhood.  The same set of regressions has been run but samples 
are divided by neighbourhood using ‘interaction term’ between housing tenure and 
neighourhoods in order to find out if the neighbourhood characteristics collectively 
influence the relationship between people’s housing tenure status and their sympathy for 
nail households. Here, the analysis considers two distinct types of neighbourhoods: village-
in-the-city (Pazhou village) versus inner-city neighbourhoods (Zhibao and Yuexiu South). 
Table 5 reveals that the homeownership effect on sympathy for nail households is largely 
concentrated in Pazhou village. In other words, in inner-city neighbourhoods, there is no 
statistically significant difference between homeowners and private tenants. Furthermore, 
inconsistent with the results from the total sample regression, the effect of homeownership 
on Pazhou village residents’ sympathy for nail households turns out to be independent from 
people’s concern for demolition as seen in Model (3), Table 5: The coefficient of Pazhou 
homeowners experienced a marginal change from 1.988 in Model (2) to 2.052. This 
outcome differs from what was observed in Table 3 when neighbourhood effects were not 
considered. There appears to be no relationship observed between people’s concern for 
demolition and their sympathy for nail households in Pazhou village. In contrast, the 
relationship does exist in the inner city neighbourhoods: the addition of concern for 
demolition dummies indeed reduces the coefficient of homeowners (from 0.277 to 0.178), 
which is consistent with the result in Table 3. 
 
Possible explanations for the results above, that is homeowners in the Pazhou village having 
sympathy for nail houses independent from their concern for demolition, may be the 
village’s particular characteristics that are not captured in the questionnaire survey and the 
regression model. At the time of the questionnaire survey, all three study neighbourhoods 
were under pressure from the local governments to complete demolition and site clearance 
in time for the commencement of the Guangzhou Summer Asian Games that took place in 
November 2010. In retrospect, it turned out that by the end of the first half of 2010, 
approximately six months after the questionnaire survey, only Pazhou village was 
completely demolished, while demolition works in the other two neighbourhoods were half 
completed and put on hold until after the Asian Games. This suggests that the Pazhou 
villagers who owned properties would have been very much aware of the impending 
demolition of their village. While these villagers might have been very much worried about 
the demolition itself, knowing the inevitability that loomed over their village, the majority 
of them would be more concerned about the size of redevelopment compensation that they 
were entitled to for being the member of their village collective. News reports suggest that 
only a handful of local villagers resisted demolition by early 2010 (Nanfang Dushibao, 
2011). 
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Table 5. Housing tenure and degree of sympathy for nail households by 
neighbourhood 
(Dependent variable: ‘Do you agree or disagree that nail-house is an inevitable phenomenon?’ with 
options of (1) very much disagree, (2) somewhat disagree, (3) don’t know (4) somewhat agree, (5) 
very much agree) 
 (1)Tenure (2) Other controls (3) Demolition worry 
 Coeff.
(a)
 S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. 
       
Tenure (private tenants exc.)      
Pazhou village       
Homeowners(b) 0.696*** (0.237) 1.988*** (0.611) 2.052*** (0.625) 
Inner-city       
Homeowners 0.336 (0.231) 0.277 (0.387) 0.178 (0.390) 
Public tenants 0.310 (0.323) 0.140 (0.473) 0.089 (0.478) 
       
Hukou (non-GH agricultural exc.)       
GH, urban   0.328 (0.437) 0.350 (0.445) 
GH, agricultural   -0.373 (0.453) -0.370 (0.453) 
non-GH, urban   0.295 (0.443) 0.333 (0.452) 
Age   0.012 (0.012) 0.014 (0.012) 
Male   0.020 (0.244) 0.108 (0.250) 
Head of Household   0.228 (0.238) 0.208 (0.241) 
Size of Household   0.056 (0.065) 0.060 (0.067) 
Education level (no schooling exc.)      
Primary to high school   -0.636 (0.760) -0.564 (0.816) 
College   -0.944 (0.848) -0.782 (0.904) 
University   -0.053 (0.887) 0.075 (0.948) 
Employment status (in schooling exc.)      
No job after interrupting study   -2.771 (2.303) -3.124 (2.437) 
Non-paid family business   -3.115 (2.041) -2.803 (2.104) 
Unemployed   -3.197* (1.924) -3.041 (1.966) 
Retired   -3.266* (1.917) -3.192 (1.958) 
Never had a job   -2.940 (2.119) -2.981 (2.331) 
Employed, regular   -2.615 (1.886) -2.499 (1.923) 
Temp. worker   -3.033 (1.911) -2.913 (1.949) 
Self-employed   -2.819 (1.909) -2.624 (1.952) 
Farming   -3.244* (1.944) -3.138 (2.002) 
Regarding oneself as middle class  -0.431* (0.252) -0.438* (0.259) 
Size of living space   -0.001 (0.001) -0.001 (0.001) 
Log of monthly HH income   -0.044 (0.193) -0.064 (0.194) 
% share of rental income   0.740 (1.317) 0.570 (1.366) 
Neighbouhood (inner city exc.)       
Pazhou village   -0.716 (0.821) -1.473 (1.021) 
Respondent being party member  1.413** (0.718) 1.436** (0.727) 
Presence of party member in household  0.678** (0.272) 0.741*** (0.276) 
Length of stay in neighbourhood   -0.012 (0.009) -0.014 (0.009) 
Household asset including real estate 
(over 500,000 RMB exc.) 
      
Pazhou village       
Less than 10,000   0.600 (0.806) 0.644 (0.864) 
10,000 ~ 50,000   0.666 (0.724) 0.700 (0.723) 
50,000 ~ 100,000   0.910 (0.622) 0.898 (0.641) 
100,000 ~ 200,000   1.066* (0.585) 1.135* (0.595) 
200,000 ~ 500,000   -0.308 (0.433) -0.302 (0.453) 
Inner-city       
Less than 10,000   0.022 (0.611) -0.216 (0.616) 
10,000 ~ 50,000   0.803 (0.604) 0.598 (0.600) 
50,000 ~ 100,000   0.875 (0.714) 0.750 (0.698) 
100,000 ~ 200,000   1.207* (0.623) 1.167* (0.602) 
200,000 ~ 500,000   0.914 (0.683) 0.622 (0.694) 
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 (1)Tenure (2) Other controls (3) Demolition worry 
 Coeff.
(a)
 S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. 
 
Concern for demolition (very much worried 
exc.) 
      
Pazhou village       
Not worried     -0.163 (0.480) 
Somewhat worried     -0.133 (0.587) 
Inner-city       
Not worried     -0.874*** (0.335) 
Somewhat worried     -0.658 (0.425) 
Pseudo R-squared 0.0066  0.0560  0.0639  
No. of obs. 381  381  381  
Note: (a) *, **, *** significant at 10%, 5%, 1% respectively. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. (b) Listed homeowners only, 
as there are no public tenants among Pazhou village respondents in the regression sample 
 
Continuing from the above explanation, the independent effect of homeownership on 
sympathy for nail households from demolition concern among the Pazhou homeowners may 
also be explained by the unique ‘governance’ structure experienced in villages-in-the-city as 
well as these villagers’ collective ownership of land (for more discussions on this, see Hsing 
(2010), especially Chapter 5). Each villager’s membership in the village collectives 
guarantees entitlement to a certain share of financial benefits that may be reaped from the 
development of village land, planned and implemented by the village leadership. While 
there may potentially be disputes and conflicts within the collective with regard to the 
equitable redistribution of future benefits from village redevelopment, it may be assumed 
that villagers are relatively in a better position in terms of safeguarding their assets in 
comparison with homeowners or public tenants in inner-city neighbourhoods who are more 
likely to launch individualised resistance and/or negotiation. 
 
Building a foothold for migrants’ right to the city through alliance 
The sympathetic feeling towards nail households is evident among surveyed residents. This 
positive feeling was consistent across people of different tenure, hukou status and 
neighbourhood location as shown in Table 1. The regression results further indicate that 
homeowners stand out, as expected, in terms of the strength of this feeling of sympathy for 
nail households when compared with private tenants. Private tenants’ sympathy for nail 
houses is comparatively weaker than homeowners or public tenants, but a substantially high 
share of private tenants (49 percent) and migrants (51 percent) were sympathising with nail 
households (see Table 1), suggesting that there is a great opportunity to exploit in terms of 
building solidarity. As noted earlier, homeowners and local villagers in urban China are 
entitled to redevelopment compensation and relocation measures on the basis of their 
property ownership and membership in village collectives respectively. Public rental tenants 
are also eligible to receive compensation if their residence is administratively allocated, 
which by default would usually mean that they possess local hukou. Migrants without local 
hukou face restrictions in terms of the level of access to various services, which are 
provided in host cities increasingly on the basis of ‘local citizenship’ (Smart and Smart, 
2001). This preferential treatment of urban residents has led to the rise of what Li Zhang 
calls “urban nativism” (2002, p.327). A natural question that arises from this is: Would 
urban residents with local hukou and entitlement to compensation and relocation feel 
positive about granting the same kind of entitlement for their private tenants including 
migrant neighbours? 
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The above question was one of the topics of discussions with local residents in the 
aforementioned semi-structured interviews.
9
 As expected from the questionnaire survey 
results, the majority of interviewees who expressed their views on nail-house activities were 
feeling positive or sympathetic about nail-house activities (14 interviewees out of 21). Quite 
interestingly, in the case of responses to the question of granting redevelopment 
compensation to private tenants and migrants, there is a marginal and yet noticeable 
difference between the interviewees from the Zhibao inner-city neighbourhood and those 
from Pazhou village. In the case of Zhibao, twelve out of sixteen interviewees were clearly 
expressing their views about this, and of the twelve interviewees, three were disinterested in 
the subject matter, while nine were expressing negative feeling about the proposition, 
stating that tenants were tenants and that unlike landlords, they were not to be subject to 
compensation. For instance, a male interviewee who had been living in the Zhibao 
neighbourdhood for more than forty years pointed out that tenants and migrants “should not 
be compensated, as they are not homeowners and are living here only as renters. It is only 
logical that homeowners are given this [compensation]”. 
 
Interestingly, among the Pazhou residents, however, the views were rather mixed. While 
only six out of thirteen interviewees were clearly voicing out their views about the said 
proposition, only two were articulating a negative attitude, and the other four (two migrants 
and two Guangzhou hukou holders) were explicitly positive about the idea of granting 
redevelopment compensation to migrants in particular. A migrant interviewee who had been 
living in Pazhou for about ten years before displacement argued that migrants should 
“receive compensation, as numerous migrants have invested in the neighbourhood”. This 
view was shared by an 82-year-old male migrant interviewee who was displaced after living 
in Pazhou for about two years. He supported the idea of allowing compensation “if 
[buildings were] rented and have a signed contract”. He added: 
“Let me give you an example for you to listen to. The father of that man who 
set up the factory had invested money there [in Pazhou], renting a building 
from someone with a surname Xie and signed a contract...In the contract it 
was as such that relocation compensation would all be his landlord’s. The 
result was that he did not receive any. It was miserable for him. He invested 
tens of thousands of money and did not retrieve any” 
Another interviewee who is a local villager holding a Guangzhou hukou also advocates the 
idea of making relocation provision for migrants, explicating that “they have greatly 
contributed to the construction and development of Guangzhou”. This is reiterated by 
another local villager who explained: 
“As far as I can see, they don’t get compensation. After all, they do not have 
property rights [of the house they live in]. But, they should be subject to 
                                              
9  The semi-structured interviews with local residents were conducted in late 2010, about one year after 
the questionnaire survey in order to find out the impact of the demolition progress on residents’ 
livelihood. These interviews were conducted on those residents from the Pazhou village and Zhibao 
neighbourhood were interviewed. In total, 29 interviews were carried out: eight of them were the 
original participants in the survey, and due to practical constraints, the rest were recruited through 
snowballing (recruitment of further interviewees through known contacts). Among the 29 
interviews, thirteen were conducted with the residents from Pazhou, and the rest with the residents 
from the Zhibao neighbourhood. Most interviewees were holders of Guangzhou hukou, while four 
from Pazhou were non-Guangzhou hukou holders. 
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relocation measures. They have contributed a lot to the construction of 
Guangzhou. Demolition and house-moving would have a great impact on 
people, and they should be relocated” 
While the views of the above interviewees may not be conclusive nor representative of the 
residents in both Pazhou and Zhibao, they seem to suggest a greater potential in places like 
the Pazhou village in terms of promoting a sense of solidarity on the basis of mutual 
understanding in order to voice their concern and put forward greater claims on imagining 
what kind of city is to be built. The concentration of migrants’ daily and commercial 
activities in villages-in-the-city and the benefits that are reaped by local villagers from this 
concentration of migrants’ activities seems to provide an ample opportunity for exploiting 
place-based alliance. 
 
Conclusion: Seeking a popular place-based alliance for the right to the city 
For Lefebvre, the key to the right to the city would be realising ‘revolutionary urbanism’ 
and political participation rather than merely critiquing the capitalist production of urban 
space. Discussions about the right to the city in rapidly urbanising China would inevitably 
include the temporal and spatial dimension of the key question, ‘whose right counts’. In 
China’s urban development contexts, the key role of the real estate sector and land 
development (Shin, 2011; Hsing, 2010) results in the situation in which the right to the city 
for developers and local authorities, and to some extent for those affluent home-buyers, are 
guaranteed. As mentioned earlier in the paper, the domination of land-based politics in 
urban China in which the control of power and resources are heavily skewed in favour of 
local states and developers also imposes greater pressure on residents. A particular segment 
of urban population, that is, private tenants including migrants, are severely disadvantaged 
in the process of urban renewal. 
 
Urban (re-)development projects are often subordinate to local economic development 
strategies, while urban land assembly and the sale of land use rights become critical to local 
state’s performance and public finance (Haila, 1999; Ding 2005). Local authorities in China 
are highlighted for their “target-driven approach to implement policy” (Plummer, 2004: 7), 
and for their entrepreneurial orientation (Shin, 2009). Under these circumstances, the 
property rights reform and the strengthened protection of private properties would naturally 
give rise to the emergence of property rights activism especially among homeowners. The 
recent phenomena of homeowner-led protests against projects with potentially hazardous 
environmental outcome demonstrate this.
10
 Nail households reflect the signs of this activism 
translated into urban struggles surrounding urban renewal projects, frequently launched by 
homeowners who are increasingly organised to fight for their ownership rights and related 
property-based interests (Read, 2003; Yip and Jiang, 2011). It is, however, not clear how 
these struggles by homeowners would incorporate the rights of tenants and especially those 
of migrants. 
 
                                              
10  One of the well-known cases is the Shanghai residents’ protest against the high-speed rail link 
between Shanghai and Hangzhou, which took place in the summer of 2009. See Kurtenbach (2009) 
for its coverage by The Guardian. 
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Then, what would be the way forward for China’s urban residents to claim their right to the 
city? The struggle to re-claim the right to the city for the oppressed, alienated and 
economically deprived may be subject to challenges of different nature in countries 
experiencing transition from socialist planned economy to market economy. In China, 
recent reports suggest that there are concessions being made by governments to adopt more 
inclusionary measures (e.g. public hearings) to alleviate local residents’ frustration against 
demolition and displacement (Cai, 2007; People’s Daily, 2011). These are nevertheless 
aimed at property owners without giving explicit considerations to private tenants or 
migrants. This suggests, however, how concessionary measures such as participatory 
practices can be adopted selectively by ruling authorities as part of measures to subdue 
rising popular discontents. In Vietnam, for instance, where market-oriented economic 
liberalization has been implemented without significant change to the political system, the 
promotion of participatory decision-making at the commune level turns out to be interpreted 
as “a feedback mechanism” for “absorbing popular discontent into the formal structures of 
the Party-state” (Mattner, 2004, p.126). In mainland China, deliberative democratic process, 
if it at all exists, can be skewed in favour of the Communist Party members or at least to 
those loyal to the Party disciplines (Leib and He, 2006). Sajor and Ongsakul (2007) also 
states that in many transitional countries, “institutions for participatory planning and for fair 
negotiations in environmental conflict situations are non-existent or undeveloped to date” 
(Sajor and Ongsakul, 2007, p.797). The progress that China makes in terms of allowing 
greater room for public participation is commendable, but these concessionary policy 
measures are confined to property owners without extending to include non-owners in the 
schema. There is more to be demanded through collective actions that bring together owners 
and non-owners, in particular migrant tenants. As argued in this paper, there may be a 
possibility to form this alliance, as demonstrated by their attitudes toward nail-house 
protesters. 
 
Furthermore, the key point in Lefebvre’s framework is to ensure that “The right to the city 
was a right to use, the right of appropriation (clearly distinct from the right to property)” 
(Mitchell and Villanueva 2010, p.668). Hence, the key issue to address here in relation to 
the discussion of the right to the city in Chinese urban contexts is how to re-orient the urban 
protests such as those of nail households towards addressing broader structural 
accumulation issues. The existing protests against eviction and demolition are focused on 
distributional issues (that is, sharing of redevelopment profits) without addressing the very 
act of exploitation of the built environment by developers and/or governments, and also 
without tackling speculative real estate commodity production chains. As Merrifield 
explains, “when people are utterly excluded from active political participation in city affairs, 
distributional issues...are often all that’s left for communities and groups to organize around 
and to seek substantive representation” (Merrifield, 1996, p.202). 
 
The centrality of property values in residents’ resistance against redevelopment and 
demolition also allows local states and developers to frame nail households as the 
expression of selfish acts that go against public interests. As Diamant et al (2005) point out, 
“in asserting claims (for unenforced rights or benefits) both individuals and groups have to 
learn how to couch their grievances in terms that will garner public and official support” 
(p.11). For nail households or protestors against eviction, their claims have been framed in a 
twisted way, mostly depicted as selfish demands (or, even as greed) for more compensation. 
Therefore, it is urgent to imagine a new direction to turn this around. The increasing 
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domination of the exchange value over use value in contemporary cities (Dikeç 2001) is 
also echoed in China, indicating that there is a need of imagining political programmes to 
fight this trend. Seeking the “language of commonality” (Merrifield 1996, p.200; original 
emphasis) that “would strive to bind people together, but in a togetherness in difference” 
(ibid, p.201; original emphasis). In China, the question is how to seed a binding relationship 
of solidarity, and how this could be produced between permanent urban residents and those 
more transient (e.g. migrants in urban villages), and between poorer segments of individual 
homeowners and non-owners (e.g. poor private tenants and informal dwellers). 
 
The analysis of the questionnaire survey and qualitative interviews discussed above 
suggests clearly that building a binding relationship of solidarity is not impossible. For the 
right to the city to be achieved, it is important to re-visit the central tenat that “It is the urban 
political life which is to be changed, not the city per se. In other words, the right to the city 
entails not a right to be distributed from above to individuals, but a way of actively and 
collectively relating to the political life of the city” (Dikeç 2001, p.1790). The act of 
building a binding relationship of solidarity in China as pointed out earlier is therefore a 
major political act in the country where political participation is severely constrained. The 
results from the empirical findings earlier in this paper suggest that there is a strong 
possibility to construct an alliance between migrants and non-migrants and between 
homeowners, public and private tenants. How to facilitate the construction of this solidarity 
and let it shape the future of their neighbourhoods rather than being subject to changes 
imposed upon them remains a challenge. This lies in front of urban researchers, 
practitioners and activists operating in and working on urban China. 
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